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NATIONAL PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE - A CONDITION FOR PROVIDING A COORDINATED 
APPROACH IN ESTABLISHING NATIONAL GOALS AND PRIORITIES FOR 
PROTECTING KEY RESOURCES
Grozdanka Naumovska,
Head of section for prevention and planning of technological and complex disasters, Sector for 
prevention, planning and development, Protection and Rescue Directorate - Skopje,
E-mail: grozdanka.naumovska@gmail.com
Aleksandar GLAVINOV, PhD
Ministry of defense, University “Goce Delchev “– Shtip,
Military Academy “General Mihailo Apostolski” – Skopje,
E-mail: aleksandar.glavinov@ugd.edu.mk
Abstract: The National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, created on the ba-
sis of specific sector support plans, will provide continuously secure basic services to the nation 
and the community.
Consequently, proactive and coordinated efforts through various means, networks and sys-
tems to strengthen the safe functioning, maintain and strengthen their resistance are vital to 
public confidence and the security, prosperity and well-being of the nation.
Critical infrastructure is diverse and complex, from organizational structures, models, dis-
tribution networks and interdependent functions of systems, both in physical space and in 
cyberspace, which includes respect for a variety of regulations on all fields.
Critical infrastructure must be safe and able to withstand the various effects of all hazards 
on national security, economic stability, public health or a combination of these and rapid re-
covery. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to integrate the national system for prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response and recovery in order to reduce vulnerability, minimize the 
consequences, identify and anticipate threats.
The aim of this paper is to determine the legal position or the gap with experience and good 
practice in the developed countries to offer a model of protection of the critical infrastructure 
in the Republic of North Macedonia.
Keywords: Critical infrastructure, National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Spe-
cific Sector Support Plans, Key Resources
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Introduction
Modern trends at new techniques and technologies provide a much easier flow of informa-
tion, goods, people, which increases the vulnerability to national security of the community. On 
the other hand, climate change, the destructive effect of man in nature, cause reduces resis-
tance to natural and technical-technological disasters. New threats such as migration crises, 
cyber-crime, extreme terrorism and hybrid threats are demanding new mechanisms and models 
to strengthen the critical infrastructure security in order to preserve the integrity, security and 
social and economic stability of the community.
By analyzing the models for protecting critical infrastructure and experiences in developed 
countries, we will consider the benefits that can be applied in creating policies and strategies 
for protecting critical infrastructure in the Republic of North Macedonia.
1. Terminology, definition and infrastructure division
The term “infrastructure” was first introduced in the 19th century by Swiss military the-
orist Antoine-Henry Jomini, who potentiates the strategic and operational significance of the 
leadership of the military actions. By the middle of the 20th century, the term “infrastructure” 
is a military term that denotes the territorial organization of the system for maintaining and 
functioning of the army.  Later “infrastructure” begins to be used in economic theory and in 
management theory. Currently, it is widely applied in the computer science, economic geography 
and security researc
There are many definitions of the term infrastructure. Among them are:
Infrastructure is a basic physical and organizational structure that needs of a society, envi-
ronment, organization or institution to function smoothly within its frameworks.
Infrastructure is a set of interconnected structural elements that provide a framework for 
support for the overall functioning of one community.
In civilian terms, infrastructure is defined as a term for which is made partial assessment 
of the development of a country.
From a functional point of view, infrastructure facilitates the production and distribution 
of goods and services to consumers (roads, plumbing, electricity, etc.), as well as enabling the 
use of basic social services (schools, ambulances, etc.). 
The infrastructure can be divided into:
Rigid (heavy, physical) infrastructure - refers to large physical networks that are need for 
the functioning of a country, institution, organization, etc.
The rigid infrastructure is divided into:
• transport (streets, roads, bridges, tunnels, airports, ports, canals, etc.),
• energy (electricity network, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, lines for transportation of ore, 
etc.),
• water supply network (sewage network, sewerage, sewage drainage, etc.) and
• communication (Internet, telephony, television, etc.). 
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Soft (service) infrastructure - refers to all institutions that are needed to maintain eco-
nomic, health and cultural and social standards of a state. Soft infrastructure includes physical 
assets such as highly specialized facilities and equipment, rules and regulations that regulate 
various systems, the financing of these systems, and so on.
The soft infrastructure can be divided into:
• state (state institutions, judiciary, police, fire protection, etc.),
• economic (economic zones, financial and banking systems, etc.),
• social (health care, school system, social networks, etc.),
• cultural, sports and recreational (parks, museums, libraries, tourist facilities, etc.) and
• military infrastructure.
The term military infrastructure is used for all built and permanent installations necessary 
for the smooth operation and support of the military forces whether they are in the barracks, 
whether they are deployed in another country or perform certain operations.
The term Key Resources - refers on publicly or privately controlled resources essential for 
minimal business operations of the economy and the government.
2. Appearance and models for assessing the protection of critical infrastructure
At the end of the 20th century, the term critical infrastructure protection (CCI) emerged, 
which constitutes an essential component of the security policy of many countries, especially in 
the NATO and EU member states.
The protection of critical infrastructure is connected, on the one hand, with the pro-
cesses of globalization, and on the other, with the fight against international terrorism. 
 There is a direct link between the threat of terrorism and the protection of critical infrastruc-
ture.
The immediate cause of activating the critical infrastructure protection policy is the ter-
rorist attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001, as well as the terrorist attacks in 
Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.
The second main reason is the development and control of major infrastructure projects for 
the transfer of oil, gas and other strategic raw materials.
2.1. Models for assessing and protecting critical infrastructure in the US, UK and Canada
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, critical infrastructure 
protection is becoming a top priority. Initially, this activity is being implemented by the FBI Na-
tional Infrastructure Protection Center.  In 2002, the critical infrastructure protection is carried 
out by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is regulated by the Homeland Security 
Act. Most of the obligations are implemented by the Directorate for “Information Analysis and 
Protection of Infrastructure” within the Ministry of Homeland Security.
The Department of Homeland Security in collaboration with other owners and operators 
of critical infrastructure should develop a unique methodology for identifying objects, sys-
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tems and functions with criticality from the national level in order to establish the protec-
tion priorities and build a complete database of these critical objects, systems and functions. 
 After drawing up the list, a process of assessment of each element is carried out by teams of 
experts which carry out field research on individual elements. Annually in the United States 
estimates are made at about 300 sites of critical infrastructure.
In the UK, critical infrastructure protection activities are carried out by two organizations: 
The Governmental Coordination Center for National Infrastructure Security and The Advi-
sory Council on Information Security (it is a public-private organization). United Kingdom, 
unlike the United States, has no full conception of the assessment and protection of critical 
infrastructure. This activity is implemented by the existing Ministries in their own departments 
with coordinated activity of the mentioned authorities.
In Canada within the Ministry of Defense in 2000 was established an expert group for the 
protection of critical infrastructure, carrying out a comprehensive overview of the national crit-
ical infrastructure. At the same time, Canada has a private organization, CANCERT (Canadian 
Computer Emergency Response Team), which focuses its activities on protecting critical infra-
structure information.
3. Analyzing EU normative documents and EU policy on the protection of critical 
infrastructure
EU policy of the protection of critical infrastructure is developing very dynamically after 
2004 in the context of the fight against international terrorism. From an institutional point of 
view, the EU’s policy of protecting critical infrastructure is coordinated by the European Com-
mission’s Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security.
In November 2005. The European Commission accepts so-called “The Green Paper for the 
European Program for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure” and for the first time at Com-
munity level defines the term “critical infrastructure” as a system of facilities, services and in-
formation systems, whose braking, defect functioning or destruction would be severely negative 
impact on the health and safety of the population, the environment, the national economy or 
the efficient functioning of the state administration. Apart from the term “national critical infra-
structure”, the authors of the Green Paper promote the term “European critical infrastructure”.
Based on the Green Paper in 2006, the EU launched the European Program for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), and in the process of developing the Critical Infrastructure 
Warning Information System (CIWIN).
The other key EU policy paper on critical infrastructure protection is the proposal for a 
Council Directive from December 2006 on the recognition and establishment of European criti-
cal infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve its protection.
The Directive establishes a new list and recommends a list of sectors of critical infrastruc-
ture. The following sectors are listed: Energy Sector; Sector black industry; Sector for Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies; Water Supply Sector; Food Insurance Sector; Health 
Sector; Sector Finance; Transport Sector; Sector for the chemical industry; Space Capacity and 
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Scientific Capacity. This list of sectors is not final and subject to specification. EU regulations in-
cludes significant number of directives and provisions for activities in 5 of the critical infrastruc-
ture sectors - information technology, health, transport, chemical and nuclear sectors. These 
regulations provide measures for protection of the relevant sector, but there are no criteria for 
assessing the criticality of infrastructure facilities in the sectors. EU sectoral laws have a bearing 
on the development of disaster protection plans faster.
4. National Security Policy and Building Resilience to Critical Infrastructure
National Security Policy and Building Resilience to Critical Infrastructure is the first step 
of the community to counter the physical and cyber threats. This policy clearly defines and 
establishes responsibility among national, regional and local entities and “owners” of public 
and private critical infrastructure and operators. The policy points to a clear link between the 
structures mentioned above, their function, roles and responsibilities in order to enhance the 
security and resilience of national essential functions.
Through policy, it is necessary to analyze all threats that can affect national critical infra-
structure, economic stability, public health and safety, and their combination. A great effort is 
being made to reduce vulnerability, minimize the consequences, identify new risks, enhance 
response, and recovery.
Three important strategic priorities are imperative in the policy:
• clear functional realities and links between government departments and a mutually 
united effort in the security and resilience of critical infrastructure;
• enabling efficient exchange of information by identifying the base data and requests for 
the Government; and
• conducting an integrated and analytical function in informing for planning decisions and 
undertaking activities related to critical infrastructure.
In order to implement this policy, it has to implement of international regulation in national 
legal solutions.
In principle, it is useful one agency or line ministry to play the role of a national coordinator, 
which includes:
• Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure, considering physical and cyber threats, vul-
nerabilities, and consequences, in coordination with Agency and other national depart-
ments and agencies;
• Maintain national critical infrastructure centers that shall provide a situational aware-
ness capability that includes integrated, actionable information about emerging trends, 
imminent threats, and the status of incidents that may impact critical infrastructure;
• In coordination with Agency and other national departments and agencies, provide anal-
ysis, expertise, and other technical assistance to critical infrastructure owners and oper-
ators and facilitate access to and exchange of information and intelligence necessary to 
strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure;
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• Conduct comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the Nation’s critical infra-
structure in coordination with the Agency and in collaboration with regional and local 
entities and critical infrastructure owners and operators;
• Coordinate National Government responses to significant cyber or physical incidents 
affecting critical infrastructure consistent with statutory authorities;
• Support the Attorney General and law enforcement agencies with their responsibilities 
to investigate and prosecute threats to and attacks against critical infrastructure;
• Coordinate with and utilize the expertise of Agency and other appropriate National de-
partments and agencies to map geospatially, image, analyze, and sort critical infra-
structure by employing commercial satellite and airborne systems, as well as existing 
capabilities within other departments and agencies; and
• Report annually on the status of national critical infrastructure efforts as required by 
statute.
4.1. Sector-Specific Agencies
Each critical infrastructure sector has unique characteristics, operating models, and risk 
profiles that benefit from an identified Sector-Specific Agency that has institutional knowledge 
and specialized expertise about the sector. Recognizing existing statutory or regulatory author-
ities of specific National departments and agencies, and leveraging existing sector familiarity 
and relationships, Sector-Specific Agency shall carry out the following roles and responsibilities 
for their respective sectors:
1. As part of the broader national effort to strengthen the security and resilience of 
critical infrastructure, coordinate with the National Agency/ Ministry and other rel-
evant national departments and agencies and collaborate with critical infrastructure 
owners and operators, where appropriate with independent regulatory agencies, and 
with regional and local entities;
2. Serve as a day-to-day national interface for the dynamic prioritization and coordina-
tion of sector-specific activities;
3. Carry out incident management responsibilities consistent with statutory authority 
and other appropriate policies, directives, or regulations;
4. Provide, support, or facilitate technical assistance and consultations for that sector 
to identify vulnerabilities and help mitigate incidents, as appropriate; and
5. Support the Head / or other person from Agency/ Ministry statutorily required re-
porting requirements by providing on an annual basis sector-specific critical infra-
structure information.
The term “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) means the Federal department or agency designat-
ed under this directive to be responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized 
expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and 
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associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environ-
ment.
5. National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection - Model of the US Department of 
Homeland Security
The National Plan takes into account the varying risk management perspectives of the pub-
lic and private sectors, where government and private industry have aligned, but not identical, 
interests in securing critical infrastructure and making it more resilient. It leverages compara-
tive advantages of both the private and public sectors to the mutual benefit of all. The National 
Plan is organized in the following manner:
1. Vision, Mission, and Goals – Outlines the vision, mission, and goals for the critical 
infrastructure community.
2. Critical Infrastructure Environment – Describes the policy, risk, and operating envi-
ronments, as well as the partnership structure within which the community under-
takes efforts to achieve goals aimed at strengthening security and resilience.
3. Core Tenets – Describes the principles and assumptions that underpin this National 
Plan.
4. Collaborating to Manage Risk – Describes a common framework for risk manage-
ment activities conducted by the critical infrastructure community in the context of 
national preparedness.
5. Call to Action – Calls upon the critical infrastructure community (respective of au-
thorities, responsibilities, and business environments) to take cross-cutting, proac-
tive, and coordinated actions that support collective efforts to strengthen critical 
infrastructure security and resilience in the coming years.
5.1. Vision, Mission, and Goals
• Vision - A Nation in which physical and cyber critical infrastructure remain secure and 
resilient, with vulnerabilities reduced, consequences minimized, threats identified and 
disrupted, and response and recovery hastened.
• Mission - Strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, 
by managing physical and cyber risks through the collaborative and integrated efforts of 
the critical infrastructure community.
• Goals
• Access and analyze threats to, vulnerabilities of, and consequences to critical infrastruc-
ture to inform risk management activities;
• Secure critical infrastructure against human, physical, and cyber threats through sus-
tainable efforts to reduce risk, while accounting for the costs and benefits of security 
investments;
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• Enhance critical infrastructure resilience by minimizing the adverse consequences of 
incidents through advance planning and mitigation efforts, and employing effective re-
sponses to save lives and ensure the rapid recovery of essential services;
• Share actionable and relevant information across the critical infrastructure community 
to build awareness and enable risk informed decision making; and
• Promote learning and adaptation during and after exercises and incidents.
5.2. Critical Infrastructure Environment
5.2.1. Key Concepts
The key concepts described below provide context for this critical infrastructure environ-
ment. An understanding of these key concepts influences the state of critical infrastructure and 
shapes the community’s approach to ensuring security and resilience.
• Critical infrastructure represents “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the community that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”2 The National Plan acknowledges 
that the Nation’s critical infrastructure is largely owned and operated by the private sec-
tor; however, national and regional and local governments also own and operate critical 
infrastructure, as do foreign entities and companies.
• Security as “reducing the risk to critical infrastructure by physical means or defens[ive] 
cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, or the effects of natural or manmade disasters.” 
There are several elements of securing critical infrastructure systems, including address-
ing threats and vulnerabilities and sharing accurate information and analysis on current 
and future risks. Prevention and protection activities contribute to strengthening critical 
infrastructure security.
• Resilience, is “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand 
and recover rapidly from disruptions...[it] includes the ability to withstand and recover 
from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” Having 
accurate information and analysis about risk is essential to achieving resilience. Resilient 
infrastructure assets, systems, and networks must also be robust, agile, and adaptable. 
Mitigation, response, and recovery activities contribute to strengthening critical infra-
structure resilience.
• Security and resilience are strengthened through risk management. Risk refers to the 
“potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as 
determined by its likelihood [a function of threats and vulnerabilities] and the associated 
consequences;” risk management is the “process of identifying, analyzing, and communi-
cating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level 
at an acceptable cost.”3
• Partnerships enable more effective and efficient risk management. Within the context of 
this National Plan, a partnership is defined as close cooperation between parties having 
common interests in achieving a shared vision. For the critical infrastructure community, 
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leadership involvement, open communication, and trusted relationships are essential 
elements to partnership.
2 USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 1016(e). 3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Risk 
Lexicon – 2010 Edition, September 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexi-
con-2010.pdf
5.2.2. Risk Environment
The risk environment affecting critical infrastructure is complex and uncertain; threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences have all evolved over the last 10 years. For example, critical 
infrastructure that has long been subject to risks associated with physical threats and natural 
disasters is now increasingly exposed to cyber risks, which stems from growing integration of 
information and communications technologies with critical infrastructure operations and an 
adversary focus on exploiting potential cyber vulnerabilities.
The Strategic National Risk Assessment4 (SNRA) defines numerous threats and hazards 
to homeland security in the broad categories of adversarial/human-caused, natural, and tech-
nological/ accidental threats. Critical assets, systems, and networks face many of the threats 
categorized by the SNRA, including terrorists and other actors seeking to cause harm and dis-
rupt essential services through physical and cyber attacks, severe weather events, pandemic in-
fluenza or other health crises, and the potential for accidents and failures due to infrastructure 
operating beyond its intended lifespan. The potential for interconnected events with unknown 
consequences adds uncertainty in addition to the known risks analyzed as part of the SNRA.
It also identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors:
• Chemical
• Commercial Facilities
• Communications
• Critical 
Manufacturing
• Dams
• Defense Industrial 
Base
• Emergency Services
• Energy
• Financial Services
• Food and Agriculture
• Government Facilities
• Healthcare and Public 
Health
• Information 
Technology
• Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials, and Waste
• Transportation 
Systems
• Water and 
Wastewater Systems
5.2.3. Policy Environment
The National Plan is aligned with the goal of National Preparedness, of “a secure and re-
silient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect 
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest 
risk.” These five mission areas are central to a comprehensive approach for enhancing national 
preparedness and critical infrastructure risk management activities across all five mission areas 
contribute to achieving the National Preparedness Goal. In addition, the National Plan is con-
418
Security
dialogues
sistent with the National Planning Frameworks and Interagency Operational Plans developed 
pursuant to National Preparedness. The scope of the National Plan is not meant to and does not 
alter the implementation and execution of prevention activities, as described in the Prevention 
Federal Interagency Operational Plan. The National Plan scope comprises activities that often 
support and abut prevention activities designed to avoid, prevent, or stop an imminent threat 
or actual attacks.
5.2.4. Operating Environment
The Nation’s critical infrastructure has become much more interdependent, continuing to 
move from an operating environment characterized by disparate assets, systems, and networks 
to one in which cloud computing, mobile devices, and wireless connectivity have dramatically 
changed the way infrastructure is operated. Interdependencies may be operational (e.g., power 
required to operate a water pumping station) or physical (e.g., collocated infrastructure, such 
as water and electric lines running under a bridge span). Interdependencies may be limited to 
small urban or rural areas or span vast regions, crossing jurisdictional and national boundaries, 
including infrastructure that require accurate and precise positioning, navigation, and timing 
(PNT) data. PNT services are critical to the operations of multiple critical infrastructure sectors 
and are vital to incident response.
5.2.5. Partnership Structure
Voluntary collaboration between private sector owners and operators (including their part-
ner associations, vendors, and others) and their government counterparts has been and will re-
main the primary mechanism for advancing collective action toward national critical infrastruc-
ture security and resilience. The Federal Government must make economic calculations of risk 
while also considering many non-economic values, such as privacy concerns, when addressing its 
role in national and homeland security. As a result, government may have a lower tolerance for 
security risk than a commercial entity. Both perspectives are legitimate, but in a world in which 
reliance on critical infrastructure is shared by industry and government and where industry may 
be on the front lines of national defense, such as in a cyber attack, a sustainable partnership 
must be developed to address both perspectives.
The National Plan organizes critical infrastructure into 16 sectors and designates a Federal 
department or agency as the lead coordinator—Sector-Specific Agency (SSA)—for each sector (re-
fer to Appendix B for the roles and responsibilities of SSAs). The sector and cross-sector partner-
ship council structures described in previous NIPPs remain the foundation for this National Plan.
5.3. Core Tenets
The National Plan establishes seven core tenets, representing the values and assumptions 
the critical infrastructure community should consider (at the national, regional, local, and owner 
and operator levels) when planning for critical infrastructure security and resilience.
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1. Risk should be identified and managed in a coordinated and comprehensive way 
across the critical infrastructure community to enable the effective allocation of 
security and resilience resources.
2. Understanding and addressing risks from cross-sector dependencies and interde-
pendencies is essential to enhancing critical infrastructure security and resilience.
3. Gaining knowledge of infrastructure risk and interdependencies requires information 
sharing across the critical infrastructure community
4. The partnership approach to critical infrastructure security and resilience recognizes 
the unique perspectives and comparative advantages of the diverse critical infra-
structure community.
5. Regional and local partnerships are crucial to developing shared perspectives on 
gaps and actions to improve critical infrastructure security and resilience.
6. Infrastructure critical to the United States transcends national boundaries, requiring 
cross-border collaboration, mutual assistance, and other cooperative agreements.
7. Security and resilience should be considered during the design of assets, systems, 
and networks.
5.4. Collaborating To Manage Risk
The national effort to strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience depends on 
the ability of public and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators to make 
risk-informed decisions on the most effective solutions available when allocating limited re-
sources in both steady-state and crisis operations. Therefore, risk management is the corner-
stone of the National Plan and is relevant at the national, regional, State, and local levels. Na-
tional, regional, and local resilience depend upon creating and maintaining sustainable, trusted 
partnerships between the public and private sector. While individual entities are responsible for 
managing risk to their organization, partnerships improve understanding of threats, vulnerabili-
ties, and consequences and how to manage them through the sharing of indicators and practices 
and the coordination of policies, response, and recovery activities. Critical infrastructure part-
ners manage risks based on diverse commitments to community, focus on customer welfare, and 
corporate governance structures. Risk tolerances will vary from organization to organization, 
as well as sector to sector, depending on business plans, resources, operating structure, and 
regulatory environments. They also differ between the private sector and the government based 
on underlying constraints. Different entities are likely to have different priorities with respect to 
security investment as well as potentially differing judgments as to what the appropriate point 
of risk tolerance may be. Private sector organizations generally can increase investments to 
meet their risk tolerances and provide for their community of stakeholders, but investments in 
security and resilience have legitimate limits. The government must provide for national security 
and public safety and operates with a different set of limits in doing so. Finding the appropriate 
value proposition among the partners requires understanding these differing perspectives and 
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how they may affect efforts to set joint priorities. Within these parameters, critical infrastruc-
ture security and resilience depend on applying risk management practices of both industry and 
government, coupled with available resources and incentives, to guide and sustain efforts.
Specifically, the three elements of critical infrastructure (physical, cyber, and human) are 
explicitly identified and should be integrated throughout the steps of the framework, as appro-
priate. In addition, the updated framework consolidates the number of steps or “chevrons” by 
including prioritization with the implementation of risk management activities. Prioritization 
of risk mitigation options is an integral part of the decision-making process to select the risk 
management activities to be implemented. Finally, a reference to the feedback loop is removed 
and instead, the framework now depicts the importance of information sharing throughout the 
entire risk management process. Information is shared through each step of the framework, 
to include the “measure effectiveness” step, facilitating feedback and enabling continuous im-
provement of critical infrastructure security and resilience efforts.
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Figure 1 – Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework.
The critical infrastructure risk management framework is designed to provide flexibility for 
use in all sectors, across different geographic regions, and by various partners. It can be tailored 
to dissimilar operating environments and applies to all threats and hazards. The risk manage-
ment framework is intended to complement and support completion of the Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process as conducted by regional, SLTT, and urban 
area jurisdictions to establish capability priorities.85
The critical infrastructure community shares information throughout the steps of the risk 
management framework to document and build upon best practices and lessons learned and 
help identify and fill gaps in security and resilience efforts. It is essential for the community 
to share risk information, also known as risk communication, which is defined as the exchange 
of information with the goal of improving risk understanding, affecting risk perception, and/or 
equipping people or groups to act appropriately in response to an identified risk.
Critical infrastructure risks can be assessed in terms of the following:
• Threat – natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indi-
cates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or prop-
erty.
85 Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, Second Edition 
cites infrastructure owners and operators as sources of threat and hazard information and as valuable partners when 
completing the THIRA process.
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• Vulnerability – physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to 
exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard.
• Consequence – effect of an event, incident, or occurrence.
Decision makers prioritize activities to manage critical infrastructure risk based on the 
criticality of the affected infrastructure, the costs of such activities, and the potential for risk 
reduction. Some risk management activities address multiple aspects of risk, while others are 
more targeted to address specific threats, vulnerabilities, or potential consequences. These ac-
tivities can be divided into the following approaches:
• Identify, Deter, Detect, Disrupt, and Prepare for Threats and Hazards
• Reduce Vulnerabilities
• Mitigate Consequences
5.5.Call to Action: Steps to Advance The National Effort
This Call to Action guides efforts to achieve national goals aimed at enhancing national 
critical infrastructure security and resilience. These activities will be performed collaboratively 
by the critical infrastructure community. Federal departments and agencies, engaging with SLTT, 
regional, and private sector partners—taking into consideration the unique risk management 
perspectives, priorities, and resource constraints of each sector—will work together to promote 
continuous improvement of security and resilience efforts to accomplish the tasks below. The 
actions listed in this section are not intended to be exhaustive nor is it anticipated that every 
sector will take every action. Instead, this section is intended as a roadmap to guide national 
progress while allowing for differing priorities in different sectors. As such, the actions list-
ed below provide strategic direction for national efforts in the coming years. Call-out boxes 
throughout this section identify linkages between the Call to Action activities and the national 
goals presented in section 2.
It include:
• Build upon Partnership Efforts:
• Innovate in Managing Risk:
• Focus on Outcomes:
6. Special Sector Plans
Each sector agency has developed a specific plan detailing the application of the NIPP frame-
work to the unique characteristics and risk of their sector.
Special Sector Plans (SSPs) provide the way NIPP is implemented in all key infrastructure and 
key resources (CICRs) sectors as well as the national framework for each sector to respond to 
its unique characteristics and risk. This coordinated approach applies federal resources and 
resources in the most effective way to manage risk.
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Sector - Specific Agency Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Sector
Department of Agriculture
Department of Health and Human Services
Agriculture and Food
Department of Defense Defense Industrial Base
Department of Energy Energy
Department of Health and Human Services Public Health and Healthcare
Department of the Interior National Monuments and Icons
Department of the Treasury Banking and Finance
Environment Protection Agency Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems
Department of Homeland Security
Office of infrastructure Protection
Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Dams
Emergency Services
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Cyber Security and Telecommunications 
Information Technology Communications
Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration Postal and Shipping
Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration
United States Coast Guard
Transportation Systems
Department of Homeland Security
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Federal Protective Service
Government Facilities
Table 1. Sector- Specific Agency - Critical Infrastructure/Key resources Sector
As part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the public and private sector partners 
in each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and the state, local, tribal, and territorial govern-
ment community have developed a Sector-Specific Plan that focuses on the unique operating 
conditions and risk landscape within that sector. Developed in close collaboration with federal 
agencies and private sector partners, the Sector-Specific Plans are updated every four years to 
ensure that each sector is adjusting to the ever-evolving risk landscape.
SSPs are tailored to address the unique characteristics and risk landscapes of each sector 
while also providing consistency for protective programs, public and private protection invest-
ments, and resources:
• Define sector security partners, authorities, regulatory bases, roles and responsibilities, 
and interdependencies;
• Establish or institutionalize already existing procedures for sector interaction, informa-
tion sharing, coordination, and partnership;
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• Establish the goals and objectives, developed collaboratively with security partners, re-
quired to achieve the desired protective posture for the sector;
• Identify international considerations; and
• Identify the sector-specific approach or methodology that Sector-Specific Agencies 
(SSAs), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other se-
curity partners, will use to implement risk management framework activities consistent 
with the NIPP.
7. Conclusion
Republic of North Macedonia has not yet established a critical infrastructure regulation, for 
many reasons:
• which institution to be competent,
• does that institution have staff and facilities to brings and solves all issues,
• existing methodologies of risk assessment is not an appropriate (one from CMC, one 
from PRD)
• existing Plan for protection and rescue from natural and other disasters are not national 
in the right sense, it is more institutional,
• overlapping in regulation from different entities
We can conclude that is good opportunity to make clarify and finally to make more effort 
in prepare policy of critical infrastructure, new regulation, use the best practices for planning 
process, with clear rules and responsibilities, with unique approach on national, regional and 
local level with good cooperation and collaboration with private business sector and operators. 
It is good opportunity to separate prevention and preparedness in existing documents with 
amending or prepare a new. Plan for protection and rescue will be good to divide in two separate 
national plans, one for protection of critical infrastructure and another for preparedness, emer-
gency response plan. In this case will be more easy to coordinate and collaborate in two deferent 
scopes, prevention and preparedness. This is necessary, to integrate the national system for pre-
vention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery in order to reduce vulnerability, minimize 
the consequences, identify and anticipate threats.
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